arXiv:2606. 06531v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The critical question after a correct driving veto is not only whether a maneuver is unsafe, but whether the blocked interaction admits a lawful, auditable, and responsibility-bounded repair.
By Yifan Wang
The paper investigates how multiple pre‑action controls—authority, resource, and evidence gates—interact in agentic AI systems. It formalizes remediation‑induced control coupling, showing that remediation can invalidate earlier judgments and that the order of remediation matters. The authors propose a remediate‑and‑regate protocol to restore soundness, analyze non‑commuting remediation operators, and demonstrate the approach on a deterministic open‑data artifact with three published engines.
By Gaston Besanson
arXiv:2606. 26057v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI agents are granted access to tools, APIs, and other infrastructure, making them active principals in those systems.
By Seth Dobrin, {\L}ukasz Chmiel
arXiv:2606. 07437v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The ISO 26262 standard defines functional safety for road vehicles through risk assessments based on Severity, Exposure, and Controllability, grounded in a human-driven vehicle paradigm.
By Chaitanya Shinde, Hadi Hajieghrary, Paul Schmitt, Adam Shoemaker, Bodo Seifert, Steve Kenner
arXiv:2606. 08919v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As LLM agents begin to take real, irreversible actions (shell commands, file edits, deploys), the standard safety pattern is a human-in-the-loop approval gate: risky actions pause and wait for a person.
By Emre Turan
arXiv:2607. 23532v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Swarms of LLM-assisted autonomous robots are increasingly proposed for cooperative intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) in contested environments.
By Nikolaos Kekatos, Stylianos Basagiannis, Panagiotis Katsaros, Alexios Lekidis, Tom Nianios