arXiv:2606. 19129v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Dealing simultaneously with confidentiality and Byzantine behaviors in decentralized learning is a challenging problem.
Dealing simultaneously with confidentiality and Byzantine behaviors in decentralized learning is a challenging problem. Indeed, in decentralized learning, clients train a machine learning model while keeping their data locally and share their model parameters or gradients with a set of neighbors.
arXiv:2607. 06612v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Federated Learning (FL) enables multiple clients to collaboratively train machine learning models while retaining data locality, thereby enhancing user privacy.
Federated Learning (FL) enables multiple clients to collaboratively train machine learning models while retaining data locality, thereby enhancing user privacy. However, traditional FL frameworks rely on a centralized aggregation server and assume honest-but-curious clients, making them susceptible to both server-side inference and client-side poisoning attacks.
arXiv:2606. 10780v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Secure aggregation is a vital component for mitigating gradient leakage in federated learning, but its communication cost conventionally scales with the gradient dimension.
arXiv:2607. 08651v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Decentralized federated learning (DFL) removes the central server by letting nodes exchange model updates through peer-to-peer gossip, but existing gossip-based methods often lack provenance finality and resilience to Byzantine or lazy participants.
arXiv:2405. 07708v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Decentralized learning (DL) enables participants to collaboratively train models without a central server, yet it faces significant scalability challenges that demand sparsification to reduce the prohibitive communication costs of peer-to-peer exchange.
arXiv:2609.37011v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Federated learning enables multiple clients to collaboratively train models without sharing their private data. However, the lack of visibility into...
The paper introduces DP‑BR‑FedAvg, a federated learning framework that combines Gaussian‑mechanism differential privacy with a coordinate‑wise trimmed‑mean Byzantine‑robust aggregation rule. It is evaluated on a simulated cross‑institutional classification task for fraud and clinical‑risk scoring, showing that plain FedAvg fails when a quarter of twenty clients are Byzantine, while DP‑BR‑FedAvg recovers more signal and bounds privacy loss. The study demonstrates that privacy and robustness interact, and system design for regulated, adversarial, cross‑institutional settings must account for this interaction.
The paper introduces DP‑BR‑FedAvg, a federated learning framework that combines Gaussian‑mechanism differential privacy with a coordinate‑wise trimmed‑mean Byzantine‑robust aggregation rule. It is evaluated on a simulated cross‑institutional classification task involving fraud and clinical‑risk scoring, where it improves the F1‑score for a minority class from 0.030 (plain FedAvg) to 0.119 while bounding privacy loss. The study demonstrates that privacy and robustness mechanisms interact, and that system design for regulated, adversarial, cross‑institutional settings must account for this interaction.
arXiv:2512. 13666v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: The security and decentralization of Proof-of-Work (PoW) have been well-tested in existing blockchain systems.
arXiv:2604. 07125v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: This article presents DDP-SA, a scalable privacy-preserving federated learning framework that jointly leverages client-side local differential privacy (LDP) and full-threshold additive secret sharing (ASS) for secure aggregation.
The paper demonstrates that in decentralized federated learning, secure aggregation implemented through local neighborhood aggregation can leak private model updates. By exploiting the asymmetric aggregate views available to colluding semi‑honest nodes, the authors formulate the problem as a Hidden Subset Sum Problem and develop a lattice‑based reconstruction attack. Experiments on image, tabular, and text datasets show that attackers can recover honest participants’ updates and reconstruct private training data.