Pretraining Data Can Be Poisoned through Computational Propaganda
arXiv:2607. 15267v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Poisoning pretraining data can introduce harmful behaviors to LMs that are difficult to detect and mitigate.
arXiv:2606. 08649v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Forensic analysis of web server logs demands both accurate detection and human-readable explanations that can satisfy legal requirements.
arXiv:2607. 15267v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Poisoning pretraining data can introduce harmful behaviors to LMs that are difficult to detect and mitigate.
arXiv:2608. 16508v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We propose a two-stage large language model (LLM) framework for zero-shot detection of insider threats and advanced persistent threats (APTs) from heterogeneous security logs.
arXiv:2501. 14728v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: While generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) models have achieved significant success, their misuse for generating deceptive content raises growing concerns about online information security.
arXiv:2606. 18190v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Multi-stage cyberattacks span system, network, and browser logs.
arXiv:2607. 08011v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models have enabled powerful code completion systems that assist developers by predicting subsequent lines of code.
arXiv:2607. 24348v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) are difficult to detect and interpret due to their multi-stage and stealthy nature.
arXiv:2607. 20216v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Malware analysis demands rapid interpretation of complex detonation reports spanning filesystem, network, and process behaviours.
arXiv:2606. 17478v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As LLMs acquire stronger reasoning capabilities, deceptive behavior becomes an increasingly serious safety concern.
The paper introduces CTF-ABACUS, a trace-based auditing framework that reconstructs each autonomous language-model agent’s run in Capture-the-Flag (CTF) challenges into evidence‑grounded solve profiles. By decomposing actions into penetration‑testing phases and techniques, it distinguishes genuine exploitation from shortcut methods such as memorized recall or guessing. Applying the framework to 1,435 CTF attempts by six models on 240 challenges shows that only 62‑87% of recovered flags are trace‑verified, highlighting that many successes rely on shallow trajectories rather than true exploitation.
A major issue in Security Operations Centers (SOCs) is alert fatigue, as the number of detections reported is more than staff can triage in a given day. Prior work prompts or fine-tunes large language models (LLMs) to emit a triage label directly, but does not train them to reason about whether a detection is a genuine threat.
The paper introduces a three‑layer security framework designed to protect retrieval‑augmented generation (RAG) chatbots from both direct and indirect prompt injection attacks. Layer 1 filters user input with rule‑based patterns and a semantic anomaly classifier; Layer 2 enforces a provenance‑based instruction hierarchy during context assembly; Layer 3 audits model output with a policy rule engine and semantic drift detector. Evaluations on GPT‑4o, Llama 3, and Mistral 7B demonstrate a reduction in attack success rate from 71.4 % to 11.3 %, outperforming existing single‑layer defenses while keeping false positives low and latency acceptable.
arXiv:2607. 18496v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used for a range of software, hardware and human-centered security tasks.