arXiv:2605. 27681v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Alignment faking (AF) refers to a model strategically complying with a training objective to avoid behavioural modification while preserving its deployment preferences.
arXiv:2608. 04347v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Fine-tuning enables a source model to acquire desired capabilities and behaviors in a target domain while retaining much of its general-purpose competence.
Fine-tuning enables a source model to acquire desired capabilities and behaviors in a target domain while retaining much of its general-purpose competence. However, this adaptation process can also degrade alignment properties that were present in the source model.
arXiv:2606. 03810v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Consistency training encourages a model to produce similar outputs across related inputs or sampling procedures.
arXiv:2607. 18114v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Modern LLMs are alarmingly susceptible to surprisingly simple immaterial changes of input prompts: a casual hint, an incorrectly labeled few-shot example, or a fake prior assistant turn often flips an originally correct answer.
Warning: This paper studies stereotypes and biases, and contains potentially disturbing examples, used for illustration purposes only. Our findings should not be interpreted as an argument against alignment.
Modern LLMs are alarmingly susceptible to surprisingly simple immaterial changes of input prompts: a casual hint, an incorrectly labeled few-shot example, or a fake prior assistant turn often flips an originally correct answer. We study where this susceptibility, spanning sycophancy and related cue-induced biases, lives inside the model.
arXiv:2603. 18373v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: When VLMs answer correctly, do they genuinely rely on visual information?
arXiv:2607. 26173v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Alignment training, model organisms, and toy models are usually treated as separate research areas.
Consistency training encourages a model to produce similar outputs across related inputs or sampling procedures. Such methods are simple, scalable, and largely label-free, but their effects on model alignment remain poorly understood.
arXiv:2605. 24583v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Comparing a model's internal activations before and after alignment is a natural way to ask what safety training changes: one forms the matrix of paired aligned-minus-base activations on safety-relevant inputs and reads off its effective rank or top direction.
arXiv:2606. 19168v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: To achieve deeper safety alignment for large language models (LLMs), recent efforts have studied how to push safety interventions earlier into the pretraining stage, primarily by filtering unsafe data or rewriting it into safer forms.
arXiv:2603. 21396v5 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Recent work has shown that LLMs can sometimes detect when steering vectors are injected into their residual stream and identify the injected concept -- a phenomenon termed "introspective awareness.