Automated jailbreak attack targeting multiple defense strategies
arXiv:2606. 16751v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across a wide range of tasks.
arXiv:2606. 03647v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Accurately evaluating adversarial robustness is a longstanding challenge.
arXiv:2606. 16751v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across a wide range of tasks.
arXiv:2508. 10029v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Safety-aligned large language models can still be manipulated through white-box interventions that modify their internal representations.
arXiv:2510. 02999v5 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Existing gradient-based jailbreak attacks on Large Language Models (LLMs) typically optimize adversarial suffixes to align the LLM output with predefined target responses.
arXiv:2606. 11409v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Adversarial robustness evaluations of large language models (LLMs) typically report attack success rate (ASR) under fixed query budgets, implicitly treating all attacks as equally costly.
arXiv:2607. 26574v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Safety classifiers ("guards") are the dominant black-box defense for vision-language models, yet they judge an input's surface form, not its meaning: a harmful request re-encoded as set theory, formal logic, a rare language, code, or an image of text slips past a guard that would block it in plain language -- the decode gap.
arXiv:2607. 24392v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Jailbreak defenses are essential for protecting large language models (LLMs), but they can also introduce secondary costs that weaken model utility.
arXiv:2503. 06269v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Traditional white-box methods for creating adversarial perturbations against LLMs typically rely only on gradient computation from the targeted model, ignoring the internal mechanisms responsible for attack success or failure.
arXiv:2606. 04027v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Diffusion large language models (dLLMs) generate text by iteratively denoising partially masked sequences under bidirectional context, exposing a safety surface distinct from autoregressive LLMs.
arXiv:2602. 05746v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Prompt injection is a critical vulnerability in LLM agents, yet the strongest methods still rely on human red-teamers and hand-crafted prompts.
arXiv:2608. 14392v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Neuron- and path-level interventions offer the finest-grained route to defending large language models (LLMs) against jailbreak attacks, yet existing methods fall short of this promise, i.
Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where hidden triggers induce malicious outputs. Existing defenses generally fall into inference-time detection or training-time mitigation, but face two key limitations.
arXiv:2506. 22666v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: The rise of API-only access to state-of-the-art LLMs highlights the need for effective black-box jailbreak methods to identify model vulnerabilities in real-world settings.