arXiv AI

A Survey on Unlearnable Data

arXiv:2503. 23536v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Unlearnable data (ULD) has emerged as an innovative defense technique to prevent machine learning models from learning meaningful patterns from specific data, thus protecting data privacy and security.

arXiv Machine Learning
1d ago

Rethinking Anonymity Claims in Synthetic Data Generation: A Model-Centric Privacy Attack Perspective

The paper argues that evaluating anonymity in synthetic data generation must focus on the generative model rather than just the resulting dataset. It interprets GDPR definitions of personal data and anonymization under realistic model-access scenarios, mapping these to state‑of‑the‑art privacy attacks. The authors conclude that synthetic data alone is insufficient for anonymization, and that Differential Privacy offers stronger protection than Similarity‑based Privacy Metrics.

By Georgi Ganev, Emiliano De Cristofaro
arXiv Machine Learning
Jun 30

Efficient Unlearning with Privacy Guarantees

arXiv:2507. 04771v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Privacy protection laws, such as the GDPR, grant individuals the right to request the forgetting of their personal data not only from databases but also from machine learning (ML) models trained on them.

By Josep Domingo-Ferrer, Najeeb Jebreel, David S\'anchez
arXiv Machine Learning
Jun 2

Profiling Privacy Preservation Against Gradient Inversion Attacks in Tabular Federated Learning

arXiv:2606. 00986v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Federated learning (FL) enables multiple data holders to train machine learning models collaboratively without centralizing raw data, making it useful in privacy sensitive domains such as healthcare and institutional data sharing.

By Ivo Osterberg Nilsson, Maximilian Birr Engvall, Viktor Valadi, Teddy Lazebnik
arXiv Machine Learning
Jun 9

SoK: Reconstruction Attacks on Synthetic Tabular Data (Insights from Winning the NIST CRC)

arXiv:2606. 08372v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Synthetic data is increasingly promoted as a privacy-preserving substitute for releasing sensitive tabular records, yet its central adversarial threat ("reconstruction", the recovery of an individual's hidden attribute values from a synthetic release and a handful of known quasi-identifiers) has been studied only in scattered, hard-to-compare settings.

By Steven Golob, Sikha Pentyala, Martine De Cock