arXiv AI

A Theory of Conditional Collapse under Low-Rank Weight-Space Ablations: I. The Single-Block Theory and Synthetic Validation

arXiv:2608. 03620v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Activation patching and weight-space ablation both claim a component is causally responsible for a behavior, yet they act on different objects: one forward pass versus the parameters behind every forward pass.

arXiv AI
Aug 24

From Attention Masks to Inert Zero-Vector Tokens: OAttention and O-Closure for Token Dynamics

The paper introduces OAttention, a token‑level attention mechanism that assigns each token a presence coefficient based on its hidden representation. This coefficient both gates the token’s output and weights its contribution to other tokens, making zero‑vector tokens behave as true zeros and enabling exact null‑receiver, null‑source, and empty‑support properties. The authors extend this idea to local O‑components and an O‑Transformer, and demonstrate small performance changes when retrofitting a pretrained TabPFN model.

By Heyang Gong
arXiv AI
Sep 25

Every Component Is a Lookup: One Linear Graph for Interaction, Composition and Attribution

The paper proposes that two architectural assumptions—(1) attention and MLPs share a key‑value form <phi(S)>U, and (2) components read from an additive residual stream—are sufficient to answer three interpretability questions: component interaction, information routing, and token attribution. By treating these selections as a computational graph, the authors develop Unpack, a backward attribution method that validates interaction scores, recovered routes, and token attribution against established tests across models ranging from 160M to 6.9B parameters. The study also shows that contribution and causal effect can differ, with a recognizable signature in how components change when a task is removed.

By Po-Kai Chen, Aske Plaat, Niki van Stein
arXiv Computation and Language
Sep 10

How Fragile Is Safety Alignment at Frontier Scale? A Single-Direction Attack on a 320B MoE

The paper demonstrates that a single-direction white‑box attack, which projects a ‘refusal direction’ from a language model’s weights, remains effective against a 320B‑parameter mixture‑of‑experts (MoE) model (GLM‑5.3‑Flash). The attack requires only a few hundred contrastive prompts and no gradient training, and it reduces refusal behavior by up to 89 percentage points across seven harmful‑content benchmarks while leaving overall capability unchanged. However, the attack’s impact is distributed across multiple components—attention, dense, and routed‑expert writers—so that only a joint intervention removes most of the refusal ability, and the conventional module‑name matching approach fails to capture this effect in MoE architectures.

By Yi Shi, Tanyu Chen, Kai Shen