SAE Interventions are Unreliable: Post-Intervention Recovery of Suppressed Behavior
arXiv:2606. 18322v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs) decompose residual-stream activations into interpretable features.
arXiv:2607. 10226v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We evaluate when sparse autoencoder (SAE) features act as localized control handles for safety-relevant behavior.
arXiv:2606. 18322v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs) decompose residual-stream activations into interpretable features.
arXiv:2607. 20596v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Sparse autoencoder (SAE) features are used to interpret and steer large language models, yet whether a feature's causal role is stable across SAE families remains untested.
arXiv:2606. 08365v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Sparse autoencoder (SAE) features are increasingly used to steer language models, but feature steering is rarely clean: the same intervention can behave inconsistently across contexts and perturb unrelated features.
Linear probes can decode safety‑relevant concepts such as truthfulness from language‑model activations, but probe accuracy may reflect only decodability, not causal influence on model behavior. The authors show that probe weight geometry alone cannot identify the features the model actually uses, because geometrically aligned features need not be causally relevant. They introduce a sparse‑autoencoder (SAE) decomposition that ranks features by probe alignment and gradient sensitivity, and demonstrate that ablating shared, probe‑only, and random feature sets reveals a sharp dissociation: shared features drive model output changes far more than probe‑only or random features, confirming that causal relevance requires intervention beyond weight geometry.
arXiv:2606. 01695v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Adversaries can implant latent harmful behavior by poisoning as few as 1% of fine-tuning examples.
ObserverBench is a benchmark framework that evaluates whether internal mechanistic estimators—called observers—are suitable for guiding interventions, control, or safety actions in language models. It separates estimation accuracy from the loss incurred by the chosen action, showing that accurate predictions do not always lead to better decisions. Experiments on GPT‑2‑small, Qwen2.5‑7B, Gemma‑2‑9B‑it, and Qwen3.5‑9B demonstrate that observers trained on action loss can reduce deployment loss, while traditional metrics like AUROC may rank monitors differently from actual performance.
arXiv:2609.06934v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Post-hoc safety training (RLHF, DPO) is the dominant way to align large language models, yet jailbreaks (Zou et al., 2023b), fine-tuning attacks (Qi...
arXiv:2609. 12591v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Foundation models are increasingly adapted through fine-tuning, model editing, and alignment procedures while retaining previously acquired capabilities.
arXiv:2607. 01239v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Character-level perturbations bypass safety alignment in modern LLMs despite leaving prompts human-readable.
arXiv:2606. 03002v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Quantization is a standard path to deploying large language models, and a quantized model is typically judged acceptable when its perplexity or downstream accuracy stays close to the full-precision original.
arXiv:2606. 04035v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We present a systematic study of domain-dependent safety behavior in open-weight LLMs: 7 standardized experiments across 7 ethical domains, testing 5 models (12B--70B) in 4,200 interactions with dual-judge validation.
arXiv:2607. 19364v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Activation steering adds a residual-stream direction at inference time, providing lightweight behavioral control without fine-tuning.