arXiv:2603. 29418v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Although multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world applications, their instruction-following behavior leaves them vulnerable to prompt injection attacks.
Summary generated by The Flow from the publisher's feed. The full article lives at arXiv AI.
arXiv:2604. 05809v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: This paper presents Text-Guided Backdoor (TGB), an adjustable backdoor attack against multimodal pretrained models that uses natural-word triggers, namely words that can naturally occur in ordinary textual inputs.
arXiv:2602. 10179v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Recent advances in large image editing models have shifted the paradigm from text-driven instructions to vision-prompt editing, where user intent is inferred directly from visual inputs such as marks, arrows, and visual-text prompts.
arXiv:2605. 25194v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Adversarial images pose a severe security threat to multimodal large language models through prompt injection.
Multi-modal Large Language Models (MLLMs) achieve strong performance on vision-language tasks, but incorporating visual inputs through a vision encoder (e. g.
arXiv:2410. 00296v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Vision-language Models (VLMs) are essential for contextual understanding of both visual and textual information.
Text-to-image diffusion models have achieved high visual fidelity and broad adoption, but remain vulnerable to safety violations when adversaries exploit them to synthesize illicit content. Existing alignment paradigms, from input sanitization to structural feature pruning, are largely organized around unsafe concepts explicitly exposed during filtering, editing, or localization.