SAFETY SENTRY: Context-Aware Human Intervention via EXECUTE-ASK-REFUSE Routing
arXiv:2607. 13594v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM agents act on real-world environments through tool calls, and a single misjudged action can cause irreversible harm.
arXiv:2607. 20005v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: In modern IT operations (IT-Ops), the cost of an incorrect repair often exceeds the cost of no action at all.
arXiv:2607. 13594v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM agents act on real-world environments through tool calls, and a single misjudged action can cause irreversible harm.
arXiv:2606. 19356v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: When multi-agent LLM systems produce bad answers, not all failures are equal: some answers are grounded in the right material but incomplete, while others are simply ungrounded and should be stopped.
arXiv:2606. 20408v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly proposed as supervisory components for safety-critical systems, yet their robustness under sustained, adaptive adversarial pressure remains poorly characterized.
arXiv:2606. 20408v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly proposed as supervisory components for safety-critical systems, yet their robustness under sustained, adaptive adversarial pressure remains poorly characterized.
arXiv:2607. 16242v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Fine-Tuning-as-a-Service (FTaaS) platforms let users train large language models (LLMs) on customized tasks, but this pipeline could erode models' safety alignment.
arXiv:2509. 25582v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: In-context reinforcement learning (ICRL) is an emerging RL paradigm where an agent, after pretraining, can adapt to out-of-distribution test tasks without any parameter updates, instead relying on an expanding context of interaction history.
arXiv:2607. 19338v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Coding agents increasingly operate in executable environments where a failed attempt produces actionable feedback rather than merely an incorrect answer.
arXiv:2606. 13884v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Modern decision systems increasingly rely on learned components whose outputs may be confident yet wrong, exposing downstream actions to costly errors.
arXiv:2606. 01991v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As Large Language Model (LLM) agents increasingly leverage the Model Context Protocol (MCP) to operate in complex environments, the expansion of their action spaces offers agents unsafe capabilities and underscores the risk of power-seeking.
arXiv:2606. 29654v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Multi-agent deliberation among LLMs can improve reasoning, but deployment requires deciding when the current answer is reliable enough to act on and when it should be escalated to human review.
arXiv:2607. 00269v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLMs, solvers, and agent teams increasingly generate workflow actions, repairs, and plans, but a generated action may be syntactically valid yet stale, infeasible, conflicting, or destructive of the evidence that triggered a repair.
Safety alignment in large language models can be fragile under fine-tuning, as even benign task adaptation may increase harmful compliance. Existing defenses mainly follow two directions: they either intervene during or after fine-tuning through retraining or weight modification, which can be costly and may hurt task performance, or they use model-agnostic safety classifiers, which may miss failures specific to a given fine-tuned checkpoint.