arXiv:2606. 07612v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We argue that many Anthropomorphic Misalignment Research (AMR) studies need stronger evidence to ensure that they can provide a robust foundation for critical safety decisions, such as model deployment and regulation.
Summary generated by The Flow from the publisher's feed. The full article lives at arXiv AI.
arXiv:2607. 24243v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Mainstream AI research emphasises capability growth and tolerates low failure rates when average-case performance is high.
arXiv:2608. 05656v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Safety risks of AI are becoming increasingly evident in human interactions with AI technologies.
arXiv:2505. 22829v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: This paper bridges distribution shift and AI safety through a comprehensive analysis of their conceptual and methodological synergies.
Large language models (LLMs) have become significant providers of mental health support, yet they remain products of an attention economy whose operational and commercial targets favour sustained engagement over the friction that effective psychological support often requires. Developers' safety responses have been largely reactive, addressing the most visible and acute harms while subtler, longer-term patterns of risk (e.
arXiv:2607. 07766v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) have become significant providers of mental health support, yet they remain products of an attention economy whose operational and commercial targets favour sustained engagement over the friction that effective psychological support often requires.
Apollo Research and OpenAI developed evaluations for hidden misalignment (“scheming”) and found behaviors consistent with scheming in controlled tests across frontier models. The team shared concrete examples and stress tests of an early method to reduce scheming.