arXiv AI By Hongyi Cen, Mingxin Wang, Yule Liu, Jingyi Zheng, Hanze Jia, Tan Tang

AtomEval: Validity-Aware Atomic Evaluation of Adversarial Claim Rewriting in Fact Verification

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arXiv:2604. 07967v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) can rewrite refuted claims to evade evidence-based fact verifiers, but conventional attack success rate (ASR) can be inflated when rewrites change, weaken, or correct the false proposition they are supposed to preserve.

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