arXiv AI

Once a Response, Always a Response: Detecting LLM-generated Text via Latent Prompt Restoration

arXiv:2608. 05741v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) can generate fluent and convincing text at scale, creating growing risks for misinformation dissemination, educational misuse, and platform governance.

arXiv Machine Learning
Sep 14

Limits of LLM Text Detectors in Education

The paper "Limits of LLM Text Detectors in Education" argues that existing LLM‑generated text detectors assume a binary human/LLM distinction, which fails to capture realistic student‑AI collaboration. It introduces a contribution‑aware evaluation framework with eight student contribution levels and presents GEDE, a benchmark of over 900 human‑written and 12,500 generated essays across 886 tasks. Using GEDE, the authors evaluate four detection methods and find that most detectors perform poorly on intermediate contribution levels, especially LLM‑assisted revisions, raising concerns about false accusations.

By Lukas Gehring, Benjamin Paa{\ss}en
arXiv AI
4d ago

How Much Prompt Is Enough? A Blackbox Minimization of Few-Shots in LLMs

The paper introduces ramework, a blackbox prompt‑minimization framework that identifies the minimal subset of few‑shot prompts necessary for large language models (LLMs). In a case study, the framework reduces few‑shot exemplars by an average of 65.3% in character count while maintaining full propositional output fidelity, revealing that models tend to keep logical identifiers and constraint declarations while discarding natural language prose. The analysis further distinguishes between universal encoder and decoder models, offering insights into prompt compression and structural analysis.

By Ali Alfageeh, Rahul Gopinath, Amin Alipour
arXiv AI
2d ago

UniGuardian: A Unified Defense for Detecting Prompt Injection, Backdoor Attacks and Adversarial Attacks in Large Language Models

UniGuardian is a training‑free detector for large language models that jointly identifies prompt injection, backdoor, and adversarial attacks—collectively called Prompt Trigger Attacks (PTA). It measures how structured prompt perturbations shift the model’s output distribution and uses a single‑forward strategy to detect attacks while generating text in a shared batched forward pass. Experiments show that UniGuardian accurately and efficiently identifies trigger‑activated prompts in LLMs.

By Huawei Lin, Yingjie Lao, Tony Geng, Tan Yu, Weijie Zhao