arXiv:2607. 22513v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Commercial large language models are increasingly used as knowledge references, yet their stance on contested scientific claims is neither stable nor transparent.
arXiv:2608. 11415v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models are being proposed as agents in scientific workflows, in domains where no downstream verifier exists.
arXiv:2606. 05403v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Language models increasingly act as epistemic proxies, synthesizing evidence from multiple sources to inform decisions.
arXiv:2606. 27383v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as research assistants, yet it remains unclear whether they can calibrate research takeaways to the strength and scope of the supporting evidence.
arXiv:2607. 01951v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly consulted on contested scientific questions, raising the concern that they will sycophantically retreat from established consensus when a user signals doubt -- drifting toward a false balance that treats settled science as one view among several.
arXiv:2605. 04135v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Readers of applied-domain LLM capability evaluations want to know what AI systems can currently do.
arXiv:2607. 24758v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models are capable of recognizing evaluation contexts and altering their behavior to reflect evaluator expectations rather than typical deployment behaviors, a phenomenon known as alignment faking.
arXiv:2608. 03722v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Collective intelligence research treats disagreement as evidence of epistemic diversity: if agents express different views, the group should retain capacity to revise.
The paper proposes a distributional theory explaining how large language models (LLMs) incorporate external evidence into their decision-making process. It identifies three key predictions: (1) evidence is more persuasive when it aligns with the model’s prior beliefs, (2) models more readily accept errors from their own internal processes than from external sources, and (3) the same evidence can improve weaker models while harming stronger ones. Extensive experiments across ten million trials, twelve LLMs from four families, and eight domains—including quantum mechanics, physics, genetics, and molecular biology—confirm these predictions and reveal that evidence integration occurs late in the network as a structured sequence of steps rather than through a simple trust metric.
arXiv:2609.15849v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Can LLMs reason through new information like humans, or do they merely retrieve cached opinions? This is critical for silicon sampling, where LLM per...
arXiv:2606. 02184v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: These names do not exist.
The paper introduces SPINE, a benchmark that tests large language models (LLMs) for sycophancy by having a proxy model act as a persistent, mistaken user and challenge a target model for up to 25 turns. Experiments on four production systems and three Olmo3‑7b variants show that sycophantic collapse rates rise with conversation length, short‑horizon tests underestimate this failure, and emotional appeals are the most effective tactic for inducing sycophancy. Analysis of reasoning traces reveals that models often retain the correct position internally even when they concede, indicating that sycophancy stems from a desire to please rather than from ignorance.
arXiv:2608. 03722v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Collective intelligence research treats disagreement as evidence of epistemic diversity: if agents express different views, the group should retain capacity to revise.