From Contexts to Values: Context-Dependent Defeat in Abstract Argumentation
arXiv:2608. 15536v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: In value-based argumentation, an audience's ordering of values decides which attacks succeed as defeats.
arXiv:2605. 31581v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: The same arguments often need to be evaluated under different external regimes.
arXiv:2608. 15536v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: In value-based argumentation, an audience's ordering of values decides which attacks succeed as defeats.
arXiv:2604. 03588v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: AI agents operating over extended time horizons accumulate experiences that serve multiple concurrent goals, and must often maintain conflicting interpretations of the same events.
arXiv:2608. 14004v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: In-context learning is commonly formalized as inference from examples of a function.
arXiv:2607. 17082v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language model agents solve tasks by generating trajectories that interleave planning, tool calls, and intermediate results.
arXiv:2607. 20472v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: When a user asks a language model something harmful, is it a genuine attack or a misunderstood but well-meaning question?
arXiv:2606. 24976v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Foundation-model agents in multi-step, open-ended environments frequently suffer from compounding errors, where early mistakes contaminate long-horizon trajectories.
arXiv:2606. 10475v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Multi-agent debate frameworks have been shown to improve large language model performance in convergent tasks, but they are currently optimized in a way that heavily favors final output accuracy rather than stability of the process.
arXiv:2608. 06422v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Giving an LLM judge more compute does not necessarily make it check more requirements.
Inference-time safety methods for large language models have proliferated, yet no systematic comparison exists. We evaluate five defense paradigms (no defense, static steering, CAST, AlphaSteer, probe-gated) across seven instruction-tuned models (7-31B) and five attack types (GCG, AutoDAN, DeepInception, prefilling, intent laundering).
arXiv:2606. 29441v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Inference-time safety methods for large language models have proliferated, yet no systematic comparison exists.
arXiv:2606. 15420v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A constitution tells a language model what to value, but little tells us whether it does.
arXiv:2606. 22737v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Before letting an agent operate over real context, can you prove it used the right evidence?