arXiv:2609.36039v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Machine learning (ML) and deep learning (DL) have dominated Intrusion Detection System (IDS) research in recent years. Unfortunately, many existing s...
By Yufeng Xin, Bryant Goseland, Mohamed Rahouti
arXiv:2607. 01679v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Adversarial attacks on cybersecurity classifiers pose a dual threat: degrading predictions and destabilising the SHAP-based explanations that security analysts rely on to understand and triage alerts.
By Mona Rajhans, Vishal Khawarey
Adversarial attacks on cybersecurity classifiers pose a dual threat: degrading predictions and destabilising the SHAP-based explanations that security analysts rely on to understand and triage alerts. We extend our prior MLP conference study to Random Forest and XGBoost across four tabular security datasets (phishing URLs, UNSW-NB15, NF-ToN-IoT, HIKARI-2021), evaluating five attacks including three black-box methods applicable to non-differentiable tree models.
arXiv:2512. 22179v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Detecting previously unseen attacks remains a major challenge for machine learning-based intrusion detection systems.
By Rajeeb Thapa Chhetri, Saurab Thapa, Avinash Kumar, Zhixiong Chen
arXiv:2603. 17717v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Supervised detection of network attacks has always been a critical part of network intrusion detection systems (NIDS).
By Iakovos-Christos Zarkadis, Christos Douligeris
The paper introduces a new method for generating universal adversarial perturbations (UAPs) against deep reinforcement learning (DRL)-based intrusion detection systems (IDS). It leverages Probabilistic Robustness (PR) as a post‑hoc metric to guide UAP creation, integrating PR directly into the optimization objective. The authors further develop PX‑UAP, which incorporates explainable AI (XAI) to shape perturbations within realistic domain constraints, and provide a theoretical analysis of its design. Experiments show PX‑UAP outperforms existing UAP techniques in attack effectiveness.
By Hongsen Zhang, Lu Zhang, Mingjing Xu, Yi Zhang, Gregory Epiphaniou, Carsten Maple
arXiv:2606. 12075v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) heavily utlize Machine Learning (ML) but ML models can be manipulated via adversarial attacks.
By Mayank Raj, Nathaniel D. Bastian, Lance Fiondella, Gokhan Kul
arXiv:2608. 11291v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Intrusion detection systems (IDS) and automated systems for detecting and reporting cyber threats, are commonly handled via supervised machine learning methods.
By Logan Luna (Georgia Institute of Technology), Matthew P. Berkowitz (Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University), Laxima Niure Kandel (Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University), Sirio Jansen-S'anchez (Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University)
arXiv:2606. 05710v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The increasing penetrations of the critical infrastructure sector in the United States with intelligent digital technologies have greatly increased exposure to advanced cyber adversaries and operational vulnerabilities.
By B. M. Taslimul Haque, Md. Arifur Rahman, Md. Serajul Kabir Chowdhury Rubel, Md. Iqbal Hossan
arXiv:2607. 00763v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Digital forensic investigations of network intrusions require analytical outputs that are traceable, reproducible, and court-defensible - requirements existing machine learning pipelines do not satisfy, since they treat original evidence as training data and produce opaque classifications without instance-level justification.
By Jose Luis Vela Alonso, Carmen Pellicer
SPADE is a labelled, multi‑modal, simulation‑based dataset for detecting attacks on Signal Phase and Timing (SPaT) messages from the perspective of connected vehicles. It contains 1.89 million timestep records generated by injecting six classes of application‑layer attacks and one benign class into the SAE J2735 SPaT protocol, across multiple intersection geometries, operating conditions, and random seeds. Each record fuses SPaT fields, onboard camera confidence scores, and cooperative V2V peer data into 40 features, enabling deep‑learning intrusion detection systems to distinguish deliberate attacks from environmental noise.
The study compares XGBoost and RoBERTa‑LoRA for network intrusion detection across three evaluation axes: same‑dataset performance, cross‑dataset transfer, and adversarial evasion. Both models perform similarly on the same dataset, but XGBoost outperforms RoBERTa‑LoRA by 15 F1 points and 25 balanced accuracy points when transferred to a different network, while RoBERTa‑LoRA wins by about 17 F1 points under adversarial evasion. Feature‑leakage ablation shows that cross‑dataset transfer improvements are non‑monotonic and directional, suggesting leakage is spread across features rather than isolated.
"whyItMatters":"The findings demonstrate that a model’s superiority depends on the specific robustness axis evaluated, underscoring the need for multi‑axis, multi‑metric testing in network intrusion detection research."
By Muhammad Ebad Atif, Muhammad Haider Ali